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Abstract  
This article aims to answer some questions: what is the meaning of “equal right” and 
“religious freedom” written in the text of UUD 45? How if, in the name of religious 
freedom, other people’s rights are offended? how if, in implementing Islamic law, others 
people’s rights are offended? Indonesian Constitution (UUD 45) gives freedom to every 
follower of a given religion to concretize his religious convictions in public life provided 
that, in doing so, the fundamental right of others are not offended. The UUD 45 also gives 
freedom to every citizen to make his religious convictions or religious teachings become 
a state legal policy as long as he or she follows the procedural constitution written in the 
UUD 45. However, after becoming state legal policy, Islamic law can no longer be claimed 
“Islamic Law”, because it’s now provided for answering the partial question of life, 
namely how to administer the state. From a sociological point of view, in order that the 
process of legislation runs smoothly, Islamic Law should first be transformed into living 
norms. Hence, it will be easier for the society to abide the law which originated from 
living norms. Since the function of law in maintaining public peace and order depends, 
for its effectiveness, on the actual social norms of the community, social acceptance is of 
great importance. Two ways of resolution will be discussed in this article, these are 
democratic resolution and transforming Islamic Law into social norms. 
[] 
Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjawab beberapa pertanyaan, apa arti "hak yang sama" dan 
"kebebasan beragama" yang tertulis dalam teks UUD 45? Bagaimana jika atas nama ke-
bebasan beragama bersinggungan dengan hak orang lain? Bagaimana pula jika dalam 
menerapkan hukum Islam mengganggu ataupun mengabaikan hak orang lain? UUD 
1945 memberikan kebebasan kepada setiap penganut agama untuk mengekspresikan 
keyakinan agamanya dalam kehidupan publik dengan cacatan tidak mengganggu dan 
mengabaikan hak orang lain. UUD 1945 juga memberikan kebebasan kepada setiap 
warga negara untuk membuat keyakinan agama atau ajaran agamanya menjadi ke-
bijakan hukum negara selama tetap mengikuti prosedur yang tertulis dalam UUD 1945. 
Namun, setelah menjadi kebijakan hukum negara, hukum Islam tidak dapat lagi diklaim 
sebagai "Hukum Islam", karena hukum tersebut telah dibuat dalam rangka memberikan 
solusi terhadap berbagai macam permasalahan dalam kehidupan, lebih tepatnya hukum 
tersebut telah menjadi pengatur sebuah Negara. Dari sudut pandang sosiologis, agar 
proses perundang-undangan berjalan lancar, Hukum Islam pertama-tama harus diubah 
menjadi norma hidup sehingga akan lebih mudah bagi masyarakat untuk mematuhi 
hukum yang berawal dari norma hidup. Karenanya hukum berfungsi dalam menjaga 
ketertiban publik, dan ini bergantung pada norma sosial yang berlaku pada masyarakat, 
sehingga akan mudah diterima oleh masyarakat. Dua tawaran solusi akan dibahas dalam 
artikel ini, yaitu: resolusi demokratis dan mengubah Hukum Islam menjadi norma sosial. 
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Introduction  
Indonesia is neither secular nor a theocratic state. Yet it is, by no means, a 
secular state for religious life is not totally separated from the state. Although 
Islam constitutes the religion of the majority, every citizen, regardless of 
his/her religious background has the same right to hold any governmental 
position, including the fundamental ones, the presidential position, the head of 
the People’s Consultative Body, the head of the House of Representative and 
the like. Article 27, verse (1) of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945) 
clearly states that “Without any exception, all citizens shall have an equal 
position in Law and Government and shall be obliged to uphold that Law and 
Government”. 
The above article indicates that the Indonesian Constitution (UUD 45) does 
not give any special treatment to a given religion to be a state religion. Yet, the 
UUD 45 gives freedom to every citizen to adhere to his/her own religious 
convictions. Every religious follower is free, not only to hold his own religious 
convictions but also to express those convictions in daily life. This guarantee is 
stated explicitly in the UUD 45 article 29, verse 2: “The state shall guarantee 
freedom to every resident to adhere to his respective religion and faith and to 
perform his religious duties in conformity with that religion and that faith”.  
From the above feature, it can be understood that, on one hand, the UUD 
45 gives equal rights to every citizen to hold any governmental position and 
treats all citizens equally before the law. On the other hand, it provides the 
right to religious freedom to everyone, not only citizens but to all residents 
who live in Indonesia. At a glance, these two articles look in harmony and are 
mutually complementary. But if we look deeper, there is a hidden potentiality 
to clash with each other. The problem is what is the meaning of “equal right” 
and “religious freedom” written in the text of UUD 45? How if, in the name of 
religious freedom, other people’s rights are offended? For instance, the 
Muslims in Indonesia might say that attempting to make Islam into a state 
Ideology, as well as attempting to make Islamic Law to be the state legal policy, 
are normal in democratic discourse. But the problem then arises, how if, in 
implementing Islamic law, others people’s rights are offended? Failure to 
answer this problem is bound to lead to political as well as constitutional 
chaos. To answer these problems, two ways of resolution will be discussed in 
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this article, these are democratic resolution and transforming Islamic Law into 
social norms. 
Implementing Religious Teaching in a Democratic Constitution 
The guarantee provided by UUD 45 is not only the right to manifest 
religious teaching such as Islamic Law as an individual right, but following the 
logic of a democratic constitution, it (UUD 45) also guarantees the right of 
every religious follower to attempt to make his/her religious tradition to 
become the state policy. Thus, insofar as Islamic Law is not contradictory to 
other fundamental rights which are guaranteed by UUD 45, it can be adapted 
to become national legal policy. And the same would be true for other religious 
groups. Its position is the same as the position of customary laws. It is a 
legitimate source of national legal policy. But, since Indonesia follows the 
principle of democracy, the problem here is what is a constitutionally 
justifiable way to apply the Islamic Law to the positive law of Indonesia? In 
other words, can Islamic Law, through a democratic process, be applied to the 
Indonesian system of law? This is another problem that needs further 
explanation by using a democratic resolution theory. 
Democratic resolution in relation to religious freedom entails the 
involvement of all religious adherents in the process of making decisions. All 
citizens, without regard to their religious background, have the right to express 
their ideas and to participate in the political arena. Even though the majority 
frequently becomes a determinant factor in the process of decision-making, 
the rights of the minority groups cannot be eliminated by that decision. In brief, 
democracy is not the same as the dictatorship of the majority.1 
All countries that follow the principle of democracy are bound to deal with 
what Prof. Gamwell2 calls the “modern political problematic”. The modern 
political problematic refers to a condition in which a religious authority loses 
its domination over the state. At the same time, there is an increasing freedom 
to choose a given religion can possibly be done only by force. A limitation by 
_______________ 
1Alexander Peczenik, On Law and Reason (Dordrecht: Springer Science and Business Media, 
1989), p. 39. 
2Franklin I. Gamwell, The Meaning of Religious Freedom, Modern Politic and The Democratic 
Resolution (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 5. 
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force, however, is not a good resolution since it is not consistent with the idea 
of democracy. 
A democratic resolution to the modern political can only be worked out by 
letting the society or political community exercise their “activities”. Prof. 
Gamwell3 thinks that human activities are distinguished by the question which 
is “explicitly” asked. Thus, religious activities can be differentiated from 
political activities because of the “implicit” question. Based on this account, he 
defines religion as “the primary form of culture in terms of which the 
comprehensive question is explicitly asked and answered”. The term “form of 
culture” here means that a religion is “a set of or system of concepts or symbols 
in terms of which human beings explicitly understand themselves”, while the 
term “comprehensive” means the purpose of life4. Thus, the question about 
religious activities can be formulated: what should the activities of religion be 
or what should the religion do to fulfill the purpose of life? 
While religion asks and answers “explicitly” the comprehensive question, 
politics asks and answers “explicitly” the question about the state. Therefore 
political activity might be formulated “what should the activities of the state be 
and what should the state do?”5  
To clarify the above feature, let us look at the following example. If a state 
implements the law of monogamy, it means “implicitly” that it is implementing 
Christian teaching. Since it has become a state policy, the implementation of the 
monogamous principle is not intended to answer the “comprehensive 
question”, that is the question as to what should a state do to administer the 
country in dealing with the question of marriage law. The Christian community 
might say that a state is implementing Christian religious teaching, but the 
state cannot explicitly claim that it is implementing the Christian teaching, even 
though it might be “implicitly” implementing the Christian religious teaching. 
A human being, in his authentic meaning, can only be found if he is freed to 
determine it himself by letting him adhere to his religious conviction or 
religious teaching. This is the logic of the common claim that religion provides 
_______________ 
3Ibid., p. 23. 
4Ibid., p. 18. 
5Ibid., p. 32. 
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the answer to the comprehensive question. In brief, it is the comprehensive 
answer that someone can find for himself what it means to be an authentic 
human being. Because religious conviction provides the authenticity of human 
beings, it is not wise to expel religion from the political arena. But, as a 
consequence, the religious conviction has to be ready to enter into a free and 
public debate. Thus, in democratic discourse, attempting to make religious 
teaching to be a state policy is politically acceptable. But, before a given 
religious teaching becomes a state policy, it must be debated publicly to 
determine its validity. By referring to human experience and reason, the 
validity of a given religious teaching can, of course, be tested in public debate.6  
While Prof. Gamwell suggests that religion is important to politics7, Prof 
Rawls believes the contrary. Rawls8 suggests that political conceptions must be 
based on “justice as a free-standing view”. But, the “free-standing view” is 
impossible to be manifested in political conceptions without a fair system of 
cooperation9 and toleration.10 In order to be fair, the concept of justice should 
be purged from religious and metaphysical doctrine, except what is “implied 
by the political conception itself”.11 He calls such a concept of justice “justice as 
a fairness”. Thus, for Rawls, no religious convictions or religious traditions in 
the community are important to politics. This can be inferred from his 
conception of justice. A political conception must be independent of wider 
doctrines, either religious or secular ethical doctrines.  
Rawls believes that human beings have a capacity to create “a fair system 
of cooperation over time”.12 Why? Because they have “two moral powers”, 
namely a capacity for a sense of justice, that is, the capacity to honor fair terms 
of what is considered as good.13 Thus, according to Rawls, a reasonable person 
_______________ 
6Ibid., p. 190. 
7Nor Hasan, “Agama dan Kekuasaan Politik Negara”, Jurnal Karsa, Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2014. 
8John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 11. 
9John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 23. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, A Restatement (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 5.  
10John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 10. 
11Ibid., p. 10. 
12Ibid., p. 14. 
13Ibid., p. 19. 
Abu Hapsin 
AL-AHKAM 
p-ISSN: 0854-4603; e-ISSN: 2502-3209 
144║ Volume 27, Nomor 2, Oktober 2017 
must be able to concept principles of justice as fairness even though they differ 
in their religious backgrounds. 
From the above explanation, it is clear that “justice as fairness” requires 
religion to be left behind when we enter the political arena. We have to come to 
the political arena with our “original position”. This means that we have to put 
off whatever attributes we possess, either these related to our religious 
convictions, ideologies or social organizations. Thus, we come to the political 
arena only as a citizen, not as a Muslim, a Christian, a Buddhist, neither as an 
atheist. For Rawls, this is important for the sake of fulfilling a fair agreement 
and fair cooperation among the body politic.14 Religious teachings cannot be 
made as a reference in public debate. This what makes Gamwell15 accuses 
“privatises” like John Rawls of having treated religious beliefs as irrational, and, 
hence it cannot be the subject of public debate. It is solely a matter of faith and 
confession. For Gamwell, because the authenticity of human beings can only be 
found in their freedom to choose what has been their conviction, referring to a 
given religious conviction in the political arena is justifiable. But, consequently, 
religion must be ready to be debated publicly. 
The full and free debate is only possible if we change our perspective from 
the thesis of religion as non-rational to the thesis of religion as rational. This is 
the first and foremost step to be taken into consideration if we would like to 
follow Gamwell’s ideas about overcoming the political problems related to 
religious freedom. It is a necessary condition for following the step proposed 
by him, namely a “democratic resolution”. Thus, before we come to the political 
arena, our minds should agree upon the idea that religious convictions or 
religious teachings are subject to public debate and discussion. Muslims, for 
example, cannot merely say that because implementing Islamic Law is the 
obligation dictated by God in the Qur’an, there is no other choice but that the 
state must implement it. This is not a rational argument in the eyes of 
democracy, even though it might seem reasonable to Muslims. Such a position, 
however, would eliminate the function of full and free debate. This is why very 
religious adherent is free to refer to his comprehensive understanding or 
_______________ 
14Ibid., p. 22-23. 
15Franklin I Gamwell, The Meaning of Religious Freedom, p. 4. 
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religious teaching in the political debate. Muslims are allowed to refer to their 
Shari’a, similarly, Christians are allowed to refer to their canonical book as a 
reference, Buddhists are justifiable to base their arguments on Tri Pitaka and 
atheist groups can use their personal truth to buttress their arguments. In brief, 
every religious adherent is free to use his or her religious teachings as a 
reference or as a basis for political debate. This is different from the idea of 
justice as a free-standing view of John Rawls which requires justification only 
from the ideas that are implicit in the political culture.16 Hence, no religious 
conviction is important to politics. Religious conviction should be left behind 
when we play in the political arena.  
The Democratic resolution of religious freedom entails a democratic 
constitution. A democratic constitution should encompass and answer both 
the political as well as religiously formulated problems. The formulation of a 
political problem would ask: is a given constitution consistent with a plurality 
of legitimate religions, while the formulation of a religious problem would ask: 
can a given constitution be affirmed by adherents of a plurality of religions17. 
These two problematic formulations are of great significance for determining 
whether the public view or public debate can be worked out. A given 
constitution that does not encompass the answer to these two problematic 
formulations is not a democratic constitution.  
Now, let us examine the UUD 45 to see whether or not it is consistent with 
a legitimate plurality of religion. Article 29 verse (1) UUD 45 says “The state 
shall be based upon belief in One, Supreme God”. The formal interpretation of 
this article does not give any kind of definition as to what the definition of 
religion is and how many religions are considered as legitimate. But referring 
to the fact that there are only six religious traditions which are represented by 
the Department of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, namely 
Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam, 
indicates that only religions which have systems of belief in the oneness of 
ultimate reality are considered as legitimate. Thus, there is a reduction in 
meaning concerning religious freedom. To be fully authentic, human beings 
_______________ 
16John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 10. 
17Franklin I Gamwell , The Meaning of Religious Freedom, p. 161. 
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should, of course, be free to choose whatever they believe. If his conscience 
believes in the absence of God, let him be an atheist. 
A democratic constitution must also identify the participants in the 
discussion or debate and their rights in order that the discussion can be fully 
free. A procedure for making and executing decisions must also be included in 
the constitution. In order to maintain the condition for a fully free debate, the 
constitution itself must be subject to continual assessment. Thus, a procedure 
for changing or amending the constitution must be explicitly stated in the 
constitution. All of these constitutional procedures must first be affirmed by all 
political communities18. In other words, a democratic constitution should 
reflect the affirmations of all religious adherents. This affirmation is of great 
importance because such constitutional procedures are those decisions made 
prior to all later state policies and rules, and to which they must be referred.  
If these requirements have been fulfilled, logically it would be impossible 
for a state to give some support to any one religious tradition or religious 
teaching, for instance, if because the majority of the population of a given state 
is Muslim its constitution should state “Islam is the state religion”. Meanwhile, 
another of its clauses states “The state shall guarantee to every citizen 
adherence to his/her own religious teaching”. These two clauses, even though 
they look convincing and just, according to the democratic discourse are void. 
Why? Because the explicit support of the state to a given religion will 
automatically eliminate the right of other religious adherents to have a free and 
full debate in the political arena. These clauses are inconsistent with existing 
legitimate religious convictions. A democratic constitution must be neutral in 
any explicit claim of any “comprehensive” understanding. This is what has 
been the character of the Indonesian Constitution, the UUD 45. 
The democratic decision produced by a democratic constitution might not 
satisfy some religious adherents. But insofar as the procedure reflects justice, in the 
sense that procedure has been stipulated through agreement before the decision 
emerges, there is no reason for other religious adherents not to obey that decision. 
In other words, they might be in disagreement with that decision, but they have to 
_______________ 
18Ibid., p. 163. 
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obey and respect as long as it is stipulated through an agreed procedure. 
Inconsistency to the democratic procedure means inconsistency to the preceding 
commitment and inconsistency to the idea of religious freedom itself. 
The feeling or the stance that a given constitution is just might change from 
time to time. A given religious adherent might feel that the decision-making 
procedure written explicitly in the constitution is just and, therefore, they are 
bound to a commitment to it. But, later, after undertaking a series of debates, 
they find the decision-making procedure unjust. As a result, they want to 
change their previous commitment. 
Democratic discourse, however, does not regard changing commitment as 
an aberration of the commitment itself. Changing commitment to the 
overriding decisions, namely the decision-making procedures written in the 
constitution, is justifiable. Those who disagree must have room in the 
constitution in order to persuade other religious adherents, that a certain 
decision-making procedure written in the constitution must be changed. While 
they have the opportunity to persuade the other religious adherents to change 
their commitment to the overriding decisions, at the same time they have to 
respect and comply with the decisions produced through that decision-making 
procedure with which they now disagree.19  
With the above description, it is understandable that there is a distinction 
between formal and material claims about justice. Formal justice is a justice 
which is reflected by, and manifested in, the constitutional procedure that 
overrides other later decisions. As long as the overriding constitutional 
procedure has been affirmed by the other religious adherents, there has been a 
claim about justice. Thus, the affirmation of the other religious adherents to the 
overriding constitutional procedure is a decisive factor in determining that the 
formal claim about justice has been fulfilled, while material justice is a justice 
manifested in the decision produced later through the constitutional procedure. 
In democratic discourse, what has been at stake is the formal claim about 
justice. The material claim about justice might be different from one or another 
adherent of various religious traditions. But as long as the formal claim about 
justice manifested in the procedure of making, executing, enforcing and 
_______________ 
19Ibid., p. 167. 
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changing decisions is affirmed by the adherents of all religious convictions 
democratic discourse can work out. Thus, even though the material claim 
about justice manifested in a given ordinance cannot satisfy all religious 
adherents, they must obey that ordinance since it is stipulated through the 
overriding constitutional procedure that has fulfilled the criteria of the formal 
claim of justice. 
Although a democratic constitution emphasized the importance of 
procedural justice of the formal claim about justice, this does not mean that 
material justice can be neglected. The material claim abuts justice manifested 
in a given ordinance stipulated through a just and constitutional procedure 
must also be tested and validated by appealing to human experience and 
reason20. For instance, Indonesian parliament stipulated an ordinance allowing 
the practice of slavery. The ordinance is, finally, stipulated through polling after 
having been debated freely and in accord with the affirmed and just 
constitutional procedure. Although this ordinance is stipulated through the 
procedural justice and is passed through democratic principles, it is not in line 
with the idea of democratic discourse since human reason and experience 
regard practicing slavery as morally inhumane. Thus, there is a room for moral 
appraisal.21 
Given the above explanation, I would like to demonstrate that UUD 45 
follows the principles of procedural justice and, hence it is a democratic 
constitution. Its position is neutral in relation to existing religions in Indonesia. 
None of them is given special treatment. All religious adherents have an equal 
position in law and government, and they have the equal right to work and to 
have a better living (article 27). Every citizen, without regard to religious 
background, has the right to freedom of association and assembly, they have 
the right to express their thought and publish them (article 28), and they have 
the right to obtain an education. The UUD 45 is also subject to continual 
assessment. It can be changed provided that two-thirds of the member of the 
_______________ 
20Ibid., p. 190. 
21It is not the right place here to discuss whether a moral judgment is philosophically sound or 
not. David Lyons has elaborated in length about this matter. For further inquiry see (David Lyons , 
Ethic and The Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 1-35. See. Zaenal Arifin 
Hoesein, “Pembentukan Hukum dalam Perspektif Pembaruan Hukum”, Jurnal Recht Vinding, Vol. 1, 
No. 3, Desember 2012, p. 308. 
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MPR (The people’s consultative body) agree. In brief, the UUD 45 has fulfilled 
the provisions maintained as establishing a just procedural constitution. 
Based on the UUD 45, none of the existing religions in Indonesia has a 
privileged place. Islam is not the state religions and, therefore, the position of 
Islamic law is the same as that of other religious teachings. Thus there is a wide 
room given for Islamic law, and for the other religious teachings as well, to 
become a state policy, Islamic law can no longer be claimed “explicitly” as 
Islamic law, because it is not providing now an answer to the comprehensive 
question, but only to the partial question, namely the question of how to 
administer the state. Its function in the society has changed from answering 
“explicitly” the comprehensive questions to answering “explicitly” the question 
about the state’s legal policy. 
Making Islamic Law as Social Norms 
A social norm is a form of “behavioral regularities” whose function is a non-
legal mechanism of social cooperation,22 Posner believed this behavioral 
regularities result from the interactions of the individual acting in their rational 
self-interest that drives peoples to cooperate across all areas of life.23 The 
difference between social norms and other behavioral regularities lies in their 
consequences. Departure from the social norms provokes sanctions. But the 
sanction emerges endogenously as a consequence of people acting in their 
rational self-interest.24 Stigmatization of the deviant and ostracism of the 
incorrigible is the sanction which is commonly imposed on those who break the 
agreement of social norms.25 
The above feature looks very Hobbesian. For Thomas Hobbes, as quoted 
by Kamenka26, the state of nature of humans beings is nasty and brutish. This is 
why humans beings need government and a code of law as a form of their 
social contract. Thus, it is self-interest alone that drives people to cooperate 
across all areas of life, including creating government and law.  
_______________ 
22Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 4. 
23Ibid., p. 7. 
24Ibid., p. 8. 
25Ibid., p. 3. 
26Eugene Kamenka, “Community, and The Socialist Ideal,” in Eugene Kamenka, (ed.) The 
Community as a Social Ideals (London: Edward Arnold Ltd.., 1982), p. 3. 
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Without regard to the defect found in Posner’s statement, for self-interest 
is not the only things that motivated and united people to cooperate together, 
what I would like to highlights is that behavioral regularities that serve as a 
non-legal mechanism of social cooperation exist in society. Thus, the function 
of law as a mechanism of social integration is merely complementary. Without 
law or legal rule, actually, the social norms have been able to unite every 
member of the society in togetherness. Thus, social norms are like a “social 
contract” whose bindingness depends fully on the readiness of the society to 
accept that contract. As long as the society is still in agreement to accept that 
contract, they would be loyal to it. The absence of loyalty and obedience is 
usually signaled by the emergence of deviant behaviors or of social protest. 
However, the emergencies of deviant behaviors or social protest are not the 
primary subject of the moral appraisal. In other words, a person who deviates 
from the social norms can not be judged morally as right or wrong, for if all 
members of society practice cohabitation, for example, one who does not will 
be considered as deviant, or, if all member of a society justify slavery, one who 
condemn it will be considered deviant. Thus, the primary subject in the moral 
appraisal is the norm that unites individual in society, not a deviant behavior, 
by referring to human reason and experience, social norms or behavioral 
regularities that unite people to cooperate together might be evil norms, but 
people continue to cooperate together on the basis of that norms.  
From the above feature, it is clear that the loyalty of the people to maintain 
their social norms is not because of extraneous factors, but it is more motivated 
by endogenous factors. With the existing social norms, every member of the 
society will regard that deviant behavior as a stigma that can ruin a person’s 
reputation within that society. This is the endogenous power of social norms 
that will lead to the togetherness of the society. This is why the legislation of a 
given norms which has been accepted by society as their social norm would be 
effective. As stated above, in such a condition the function of law with respect 
to the maintenance of the regularities of social behavior is complimentary in 
nature. In other words, the function of law here is only to preserve the status 
quo. 
The function of law in a society can be classified into two kinds, namely law 
as a form of social control and law as social engineering. As a social control, the 
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law is intended to preserve the order as well as the existing pattern of life of the 
society. Law is directed to maintain the social system by forcing every member 
of that society to comply with the social system they have established. Thus the 
social system is like a “contract” of all the members of the society. Whoever 
breaks the contract, he/she is liable to have a punishment27. While law as 
social control looks more static and is intended to preserve the status quo, law 
as social engineering is more dynamic. Law is not merely directed to maintain 
the existing social system but it is also directed to lead the society to certain 
objectives. In this respect, the law function as a mechanism to create a new 
social system28 and hence, the law is educative and can be used as a tool of the 
vehicle for social change. Here is where social change becomes possible. The 
present social norms might not reflect the underlying values of a democratic 
society. In such a situation, the new law might educate people into new 
behavioral regularities. But at the same time, education about this underlying 
values must be done to persuade the people to adopt new patterns and new 
moral sentiment. 
Because another function of law is a mechanism to guarantee what has 
become a “social contract”, consequently the law should be built on the basis of 
social norms. The law that s not based on the social norms will not produce 
social awareness to abide by that law. The awareness to abide by the law is of a 
great significance for the sake of a legal effectiveness or enforceability.  
It is right, however, that the effectiveness of a given legal rule is not fully 
determined by the acceptance of the society of the norms upon which the legal 
rule is built. The effectiveness of a legal rule is also determined by the 
institution of law enforcement, such as the police, persecutors, judges and the 
judicial system. However, a legal rule which is not based on living norms will 
lead to strong resistance from the society. If this happens, the legal rule is 
nothing other than a “dead norm”. 
With political power, a certain norm might be legislated to be a state policy 
for the sake of directing social change. In such a condition, the law does not 
only reflect social norms but also serve as a pattern to mold another social 
_______________ 
27Satjipto Rahardjo, Pemanfaatan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial bagi Pengembangan Ilmu Hukum (Bandung: 
Penerbit Alumni, 1977), p. 145. 
28Ibid. 
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norm. For instance, the Islamic law concerning adultery and fornication, with 
political power, might be legislated to become a part of Indonesian criminal 
law. But if the society is not ready to accept the law, social disobedience might 
happen. Law that is not rooted in the norm prevailing in the society will not 
gain support from the society. In order for the law to be effective, support from 
the society is a necessary condition. This is why law reformation is nothing 
other than an effort directed to reorient and reevaluate the socio-cultural 
values underlying the existing legal rules29. This, of course, must be the main 
and the first step should be taken into consideration by every religious 
community, including Muslims in Indonesia, before reforming the existing law.  
That Islam is the religion of the majority of Indonesia is not questionable. 
But the question as to the whether their adherence to Islam informs their 
religious commitment as required by Islam is left unanswered. It is for this 
reason many religious communities have tried to think realistically. Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and MUI, for instance, think that Indonesia with 
Pancasila as its ideology is a final form of the state. 
For those who think realistically, making Islamic law formally as positive 
law is unrealistic, for Indonesia is a state with pluralistic society, either seen 
from religious conviction, ethnicity, race or cultural traditions. This diversity 
could be considered as a positive national resource in one side, but on the 
other side, it could also lead to a national disintegration. This condition is 
worsened by the fact that the spread of a given religious group is concentrated 
on a certain island. For instance, Hinduism in Bali, Catholic in Flores, Protestant 
in West Papua, Islam in Java and Sumatra etc. thus Indonesia is actually a 
“fragile” country. This is why the government and the whole element of society, 
especially religious leaders, have to work together so that pluralism and 
diversity could be managed in a proper way. 
Aware of the fact that ideologically Indonesia is not religiously based state, 
effort should be focused on upholding Islamic law in cultural level, not in 
supra-political structure. For Muslim who think realistically, spreading Islamic 
law in order to become living tradition is more important than attempting to 
_______________ 
29Barda Nawawi Arief, Bunga Rampai Kebijakan Hukum Pidana (Bandung: PT. Citra Aditya, 
1996), p. 32. 
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formalize it to be the state law. This idea is in line with concept proposed by al-
‘Alim, A. Sahal Mahfudh, a chair person of the consultative body of NU. In his 
very popular book (at least in Indonesia) “Fiqh Social” he proposed that fiqh 
social is not intended to formalize Islamic law (fiqh) as a state legal policy in a 
formal way, but it is intended to make fiqh as a social norm.30 
Based on the above feature, to avoid the clash with the other groups of 
religious convictions, creating a religious cultural environment in a society is 
more important than formalizing Islamic law to be the state legal policy. 
Presenting a substantial aspect of Islamic law or Islamic teachings is far more 
meaningful for the sake of manifesting individual as well as society piety, 
rather than presenting symbols or forms. In religious life, symbols are of 
course important, without which Islam will be reduced into individual faith. 
However, if we deal with only two options, symbols or forms and substance, 
our choice is certainly the second one, namely the substance. In the context of 
Indonesian political as well cultural life, this choice is the most realistic one. 
Concluding Remarks 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that religious teachings 
such as Islamic Law can become Indonesian legal policy provided that is 
supported constitutionally and accepted sociologically.  
Constitutionally speaking, Indonesian Constitution (UUD 45) gives 
freedom to every follower of a given religion to concretize his religious 
convictions in public life provided that, in doing so, the fundamental right of 
others are not offended. The UUD 45 also gives freedom to every citizen to 
make his religious convictions or religious teachings become a state legal 
policy as long as he or she follows the procedural constitution written in the 
UUD 45. However, after becoming state legal policy, Islamic law can no longer 
be claimed “Islamic Law”, because its now provided for answering the partial 
question of life, namely how to administer the state. 
From a sociological point of view, in order that the process of legislation 
runs smoothly, Islamic Law should first be transformed into living norms. 
_______________ 
30Munawar Aziz, “The Concept of Civilization on Islam Nusantara”, Jurnal Lektur Keagamaan, Vol. 
13, No. 2, 2015. 
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Hence, it will be easier for the society to abide the law which originated from 
living norms. Since the function of law in maintaining public peace and order 
depends, for its effectiveness, on the actual social norms of the community, 
social acceptance is of great importance.[a] 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Arief, Barda Nawawi, Bunga Rampai Kebijakan Hukum Pidana, Bandung: PT. 
Citra Aditya, 1996. 
Attabani, G. Salahuddin, “Islamic Shari’a and The Status of Non-Muslim”, in 
Tarek Mitri, (ed.) Religion, Law and Society, Geneva: World Council of 
Churches, 1995. 
Audi, Robert, and Wolterstorff, Nicholas, Religion in The Public Square, The 
Place of The Religious Conviction in Political Debate, Boulder: Rowman & 
Little Filed Publisher Inc, 1997. 
Aziz, Munawar, “The Concept of Civilization on Islam Nusantara”, Jurnal Lektur 
Keagamaan, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2015. 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, (ed.), The Islamic Criminal Justice System, New York: 
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1982. 
Devlin, Patrick, The Enforcement of Morals, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1977. 
Gamwell, Franklin I, The Meaning of Religious Freedom, Modern Politic and The 
Democratic Resolution, Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1995. 
Greenawalt, Kent, Religious Conviction and Political Choice, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988. 
Hart, H.L.A., Law, Liberty, and Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963. 
Hasan, Nor, “Agama dan Kekuasaan Politik Negara”, Jurnal Karsa, Vol 22, No. 2, 
Desember 2014. 
Hefner, Robert M. and Horvatich, Patricia, Islam di Era Negara Bangsa (Islam in 
The Era of Nation State), (trans. Imron Rosyidi), Yogyakarta: Tiara 
Wacana, 2001. 
Hoesein, Zaenal Arifin, “Pembentukan Hukum dalam Perspektif Pembaruan 
Hukum”, Jurnal Recht Vinding, Vol 1, No. 3, Desember 2012 
How to Make Islamic Law as the State Legal Policy …. 
AL-AHKAM  
p-ISSN: 0854-4603; e-ISSN: 2502-3209 
Volume 27, Nomor 2, Oktober 2017 ║155 
Kamenka, Eugene, “Community, and The Socialist Ideal”, in Eugene Kamenka, 
(ed.), The Community as a Social Ideals, London: Edward Arnold Ltd. 
1982. 
Koshy, Ninan, Religious Freedom in a Changing World, Geneva: World Council 
of Churches Publication, 1992. 
Lee, Keekok, The Positive Science of Law, Hampshire, England: Gower 
Publishing Group, 1989. 
Lyons, David, Ethic and The Rule of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993. 
Peczenik, Aleksander, On Law and Reason, Dordrecht: Springer Science and 
Business Media, 1989. 
Rahardjo, Satjipto, Ilmu Hukum, Bandung: PT Citra Aditya Bakti, 1996. 
________, Pemanfaatan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial bagi Pengembangan Ilmu Hukum, 
Bandung: Penerbit Alumni, 1977. 
Rauf, Muhammad Abdul, Tan Sri., The Concept of Islamic State; With Particular 
Reference to Treatment of Non-Muslim Citizens, Malaysia: Islamic Affairs 
Division Prime Minister’s Departement, 1998. 
Rawls, John, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 
________, Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. 
________, Justice as Fairness, A Restatement, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2001. 
Rosen, Lawrence, The Justice of Islam, Comparative Perspective on Islamic Law 
and Society, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Unger, Roberto Mangabeira, Law in Modern Society, Toward a Criticism of Social 
Theory, London: The Free Press (MacMillan Publishing Co.), 1976. 
________, The Critical Legal Studies, London: The Free Press (MacMillan 
Publishing Co.), 1983. 
Zahra, Muhammad Abu, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-Arabi, n.d. 
Abu Hapsin 
AL-AHKAM 
p-ISSN: 0854-4603; e-ISSN: 2502-3209 
156║ Volume 27, Nomor 2, Oktober 2017 
